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Abstract
Objectives We conducted and measured outcomes from the Jerry Lee Program of 12
randomized trials over two decades in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), testing
an identical method of restorative justice taught by the same trainers to hundreds of
police officers and others who delivered it to 2231 offenders and 1179 victims in 1995–
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2004. The article provides a review of the scientific progress and policy effects of the
program, as described in 75 publications and papers arising from it, including previ-
ously unpublished results of our ongoing analyses.
Methods After random assignment in four Australian tests diverting criminal or juve-
nile cases from prosecution to restorative justice conferences (RJCs), and eight UK
tests of supplementing criminal or juvenile proceedings with RJCs, we followed
intention-to-treat group differences between offenders for up to 18 years, and for
victims up to 10 years.
Results We distil and modify prior research reports into 18 updated evidence-based
conclusions about the effects of RJCs on both victims and offenders. Initial reductions
in repeat offending among offenders assigned to RJCs (compared to controls) were
found in 10 of our 12 tests. Nine of the ten successes were for crimes with personal
victims who participated in the RJCs, with clear benefits in both short- and long-term
measures, including less prevalence of post-traumatic stress symptoms. Moderator
effects across and within experiments showed that RJCs work best for the most frequent
and serious offenders for repeat offending outcomes, with other clear moderator effects
for poly-drug use and offense seriousness.
Conclusions RJ conferences organized and led (most often) by specially-trained
police produced substantial short-term, and some long-term, benefits for both
crime victims and their offenders, across a range of offense types and stages of
the criminal justice processes on two continents, but with important moderator
effects. These conclusions are made possible by testing a new kind of justice
on a programmatic basis that would allow prospective meta-analysis, rather
than doing one experiment at a time. This finding provides evidence that
funding agencies could get far more evidence for the same cost from programs
of identical, but multiple, RCTs of the identical innovative methods, rather than
funding one RCT at a time.
Keywords Restorative justice . Randomized controlled trials . Policing . Prospective
meta-analysis . Recidivism . Race . Aboriginal Australians . Personal victim offenses .
Procedural justice .Moderator effects . Crime harm index
Summary of key findings
Effects of RJCs on victims Victims randomly assigned to attend restorative justice
conferences (RJCs) with their offenders were less fearful of repeat attack by the same
person, more pleased with the way their case was handled, and less desirous of violent
revenge against their offenders, after receiving far more offender apologies and satis-
faction with their justice than control victims. London robbery and burglary victims
assigned to RJCs, especially females, suffered much less post-traumatic stress than
controls, while Canberra victims of violent and property crimes had less emotional
impact from the crime than controls for at least 10 years after the arrest of their
offenders.
Main effects of RJCs on offenders The average effect of RJCs on offenders in both
Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) is to reduce the frequency of repeat offending
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after 2 years, with high cost-effectiveness in all UK tests. While we have no long-term
evidence on recidivism in the UK, Canberra evidence to date shows no main effects on
recidivism after 15 or more years.
Moderator effects of RJCs on recidivism Relative to control groups, RJCs generally
failed to reduce recidivism for property crimes, but consistently did so for violent
crime. RJCs had the biggest effects on reducing recidivism with high-frequency
offenders, but was ineffective or criminogenic for those offenders with medium rates
of offending. RJCs were criminogenic for London offenders who used both crack and
heroin, but crime-preventive with offenders who did not use that combination of drugs.
Initial findings that RJCs were criminogenic for Aboriginal Australians did not persist
into the long-term follow-up.
Conducting RJ conferences Selection of police facilitators of RJCs based on innate
ability is more important than experience or practice in generating procedural justice as
perceived by offenders attending RJCs, which are more likely to be completed if a
deadline is imposed.
Testing theoretical mechanisms (Canberra only) Procedural Justice: Offenders
often show higher levels of perceived procedural justice after RJCs, although that does
not always lead to reduced recidivism.Reintegrative Shaming:Offenders experienced
both stigmatic and reintegrative shaming in RJCs. Interaction Ritual: Juveniles
randomly assigned to RJCs in the Canberra property and violence experiments had
less repeat offending if observers of their conferences had coded higher levels of group
solidarity and reintegration.
Introduction: how does experimental evidence grow?
The modern development of restorative justice policies has arguably been an exemplar
of evidence-based policymaking, both for better and for worse. Restorative justice has
been better in its use of randomized controlled trials—the clearest and most valid
method for testing any justice policy (Sherman et al. 1997)—from the earliest days of a
global social movement to add restorative justice conferences (RJCs) to the Common
Law toolkit of responses to crime. It has been worse because so much practice and
governmental funding has ignored strong experimental evidence on the benefits of
RJCs—especially their high value for money with serious and frequent offenders and
victims of serious crime. As a result, tens of thousands of crime victims have been
denied access to RJCs on the basis of evidence-free, intuitively political decisions that it
does not “feel right” to use RJCs in their cases—even if it provides major reductions in
post-traumatic stress symptoms of the crime victims and prevents other people from
even becoming victims.
This article is primarily about the “better” side of restorative justice as an
exemplar of evidence-based policymaking. Our focus is not on how knowledge
gets used but on how it is generated: what we know and how we know it after two
decades of testing RJCs. Our particular concern is that so many policy experi-
ments on the same research questions get done in different ways in different
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places, leaving the knowledge itself in a more uncertain state than optimal.
Systematic reviews and research synthesis, while worthwhile, cannot solve the
problems generated by wide differences across experiments in how they were
done or what measures they used. While the evidence presented and reviewed in
this article also suffers from some variations in analysis methods, all of the tests
analyzed used exactly the same training and evaluation designs. We can, at least,
demonstrate the feasibility of testing an identical method of dispensing justice in a
uniform way across 12 experiments in two countries and four research sites.
Programs versus ad hoc experiments
The history of experimental criminology is largely a collection of stand-alone experi-
ments. Unlike experimental psychology, in which replication attempts are frequent, if
often unsuccessful (Open Science Collaboration 2015), replication attempts remain rare
in experimental criminology. The dearth of replication attempts creates many problems
for both theory and public policy, since un-repeated experiments have only limited
scope for systematic reviews that assess the reliability and external validity of any
single finding. This fact limits the potential value of research synthesis, from “What
Works” reviews (Sherman et al. 1997) to the Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations
(Farrington and Petrosino 2001).
The problem of infrequent replication of any kind is compounded by the frequency
of modified replication attempts that vary key features of the program or outcome
measurement. When key features of the interventions—or their control groups—vary
between the original and subsequent versions tested, we cannot know whether different
results come from different samples or different designs. Even when systematic reviews
can synthesize the evidence from repeated tests, modifications in replications can
challenge the idea of synthesis itself.
One solution to these problems is an alternative model of knowledge develop-
ment, making greater use of coordinated research programs testing a more uniform
version of each intervention. Examples of such coordinated programs in medicine
include both multi-site trials conducted simultaneously (Weinberger et al. 2001)
and prospective meta-analysis spread out over a longer time period (Berlin and
Ghersi 2005).
This article presents a prime criminological example of a programmatic solution to
the replication problem: the Jerry Lee Program of Randomized Trials of Restorative
Justice Conferences. In 12 separate tests initiated between 1995 and 2001, the program
delivered two sets of multi-site trials that created a prospective meta-analysis combin-
ing both sets. Working in two countries, with up to two decades of follow-up, the Jerry
Lee Program tested just one version of one intervention, delivered by professionals who
were trained by the same training method and trainers, associated with McDonald
(2015).
The significance of the single training method was magnified in this case by the
sharp contrast between the consistency of the intervention and the diversity of the
responses it evoked. The intervention asked victims and offenders meeting face-to-face
to discuss just three questions, but for as long as they wished. They were allowed to
discuss their experiences for 10 min or 3 h, with or without tears, shouting, mumbling,
anger, sympathy, boredom, or what Collins (2004) calls the structure of effective
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“interaction ritual” (Rossner 2011a*, b*1). The wide range of emotions we observed
was enhanced by a sampling strategy across our 12 randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
of enrolling different kinds of offenses and offenders, different kinds of victims,
different degrees of social and demographic differences between offenders and their
victims, different stages of the criminal justice process, and differing degrees of
sanctioning severity and stigma—all subjected to the simple, consistent, single inter-
vention. The differences in size and diversity across the nations and communities where
the tests were conducted—Canberra, Australia (pop. 300,000), London, UK (pop.
8,000,000), Newcastle, Sunderland, Tyneside and other smaller northeastern English
cities, and the wealthy counties of the Thames Valley (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and
Oxfordshire)—made the contrasts in individual case characteristics even more complex
by adding contrasts in social contexts.
Each trained facilitator was told to ask just three questions of a well-prepared group
of people, all emotionally connected to the victim, the criminal or the crime, and to
insure that everyone had a chance to say all that they wanted to about each question.
The questions were (1) what happened? (2) who was affected by it and how? and (3)
what should the offender do to try to repair the harm caused by the crime? Like an
antibiotic that is used for a very wide range of diagnoses, these core elements of
restorative justice conferences were arguably delivered with a great deal of consistency
across the Jerry Lee Program.
Through both systematic observations in Canberra, and narrative reports in the UK,
we have good reason to believe these elements were delivered with very high integrity
in the UK tests, and with less but still reasonable consistency in Canberra. While a few
of the experiments were particularly challenged by low sample sizes or proportion of
cases treated as randomly assigned, the insurance of 12 separate tests minimized the
scientific damage from those few weak links.
A further asset of the Jerry Lee Program is the long follow-up period we have been
able to achieve, possibly the longest ever for a criminological program of multiple
randomized trials. While this asset is so far limited to the four Australian tests—which
were generally not as well delivered as the UK tests—the latter are now ready for long-
term follow-up by UK researchers. One aim of this article, then, is to make the case for
investment in that follow-up.
The larger aim of the article is to demonstrate the potential for using programs of
randomized trials to evaluate any new method for improving justice and reducing harm.
The paucity of such RCT programs may be blamed on a lack of funding, a problem we
must thank John Braithwaite for having solved in the early years of the Jerry Lee
Program. His extraordinary vision of how to test a theory and develop a skilled practice
to implement it was well-matched by his ability to build a coalition of willing funders
(Strang 2012a*, b*, c*), whose diverse interests helped to insure that multiple tests
would be conducted simultaneously.
Yet massive national funding may not always be necessary to create programs of
multiple randomized trials, especially if a large number of communities have already
decided to “try” or even “adopt” an innovation. The example of body-worn video
1 An asterisk designates a reference that is contained in the Appendix, a list of publications, not all cited here,
resulting from the Jerry Lee Program of Randomized Trials in Restorative Justice. All other references are
found after the Appendix in the Reference List.
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cameras for police is a case in point. The initial trial led by Rialto (California) police
chief Tony Farrar as a Cambridge University master’s thesis (Ariel et al. 2014) quickly
led to over ten completed RCTs using an identical protocol with almost identical
technology (Ariel 2014). All that was needed to turn “pilots” or “innovations” into
criminological experiments was a willing experimental criminologist to give free
advice in exchange for massive returns of data. In a world of ideas going “viral,” the
idea of randomized experimentation to test new ideas may itself be going viral. The
article returns to this question in the conclusions, reflecting on how experimental
criminology may be able to prosper because of the contemporary global austerity,
rather than despite it.
The article begins with the “One program, twelve tests” section describing the
origins and elements of restorative justice conferences (RJCs)—how they developed
with RCTs, how they were produced, tracked, measured, and with what variations
across 12 tests. We match that discussion with a similar description of the 12 control
groups. We then describe in the “Consent, random assignment and treatment delivered”
section the process of obtaining consent to random assignment, its success, and the
rates of treatment as assigned. Next, we describe in “Measuring treatments and
outcomes: short and long” the measurement of the treatments, and the various inter-
views and criminal records collected in both Australia and the UK. “Describing
treatment delivery” summarizes what we have learned about what is inside the ‘black
box’ of causal mechanisms by which RJCs cause victim and offender outcomes, both
theoretically and empirically, using interviews and systematic observation data. “Causal
mechanisms: inside a ‘black box’” begins our numbered inventory of conclusions by
describing what we know about the qualitative dimensions of delivering and receiving
the treatments based on observations and interviews. “Main effect findings so far”
presents evidence on the “main effects” of RJCs so far on victims and offenders.
“Moderator effect findings so far” presents moderator analyses of the main effects, with
the “Discussion: more work to be done” section asking what we might have done or yet
do, not just to increase the knowledge itself, but also to increase the extent to which
knowledge gained in these experiments may be applied in practice.
One program, twelve tests
Restorative justice conferences in practice and research
The origin of the Jerry Lee Program was the fortunate coincidence of Braithwaite’s
(1989) theory of reintegrative shaming and the 1989 legislative reform in New Zealand
that adopted restorative justice conferencing (RJC) as the core of its juvenile justice
processes. These New Zealand conferences were then observed by two New South
Wales Police employees: one a police sergeant (Terry O’Connell) from the small city of
Wagga Wagga, the other a police trainer and former secondary school teacher (John
McDonald) in Sydney. They extracted several principles for RJC from their observa-
tions in New Zealand:
& A conference is organized by a trained facilitator, who can invite anyone who is
affected by a crime or its aftermath to attend
& Invited participants include victims, offenders, their friends and family
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& Offenders agree in advance to “decline to deny” their commission of the crime, and
to accept responsibility for causing harm, but an RJC does not depend on a formal
admission of guilt
& There is no limit to how long a conference may last; 1–3 h is typical
& The conference has three phases:
1. Offenders describe what they did; others may add details
2. All then consider who was affected by the crime and how, including offenders; this
phase is often highly emotional, sometimes with shouts and tears
3. The final phase is a discussion and decision about what offenders can do to repair
the harm the crime caused and ensure that it will not be repeated
O’Connell and MacDonald reduced these principles to the three questions posed by
the facilitator in orchestrating the discussion: what happened, who was affected, and
what is to be done?
By 1991, O’Connell was using this approach to divert juvenile offenders from
prosecution in Wagga Wagga (after full admission by offenders of responsibility for
the offense), with MacDonald promoting its use elsewhere in New South Wales
(NSW). Braithwaite observed the conferences, and focused his 1992 Sellin-Glueck
Award Lecture at the American Society of Criminology on how the NSW RJC
implemented his theory of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite 1989) written before
RJCs were adopted in New Zealand or ever used in Australia. He proceeded to recruit
Sherman, Strang and others to plan a large randomized controlled trial to test the use of
RJCs in NSW, which were planned to be expanded across the Sydney area. In
June 1993, Braithwaite, Sherman and Strang met and presented the proposal to NSW
Police Commissioner Tony Lauer, who appeared receptive to the plan, at least initially.
Yet, on Christmas Eve 1993, Police Commissioner Lauer telephoned Braithwaite to
say he was rejecting the plans to expand or test RJC in NSW. Strang then proposed the
idea to Peter Dawson, the Chief Police Officer of the Australian Capital Territory
(ACT) in Canberra, who agreed to conduct an experiment involving several types of
offenses. Sherman developed the protocol for the ACT experiments while Braithwaite
raised funds from multiple sources, starting with discretionary research funding of the
Australian National University’s Institute for Advanced Studies. By mid-1994, a
protocol was approved by the Attorney General for the ACT, Terry Connolly, with a
program of training scheduled for some 500 patrol officers in how to organize and
facilitate RJCs. By late 1994, Strang and Braithwaite had negotiated a contract with the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) that gave Australian National University (ANU)
academic staff access to the criminal history information, along with approvals of the
Australian Privacy Commissioner and the ANU Ethics Committee.
In April 1995, 10 weeks before the RCT was to begin, Peter Dawson was removed
as Chief Police Officer of the ACT by his AFP superiors; his replacement was an acting
Chief Officer who had zero or hostile interest in the project. Yet, with the support of the
ACTAttorney General and the signed contract with the AFP, Braithwaite’s ANU team
and Sherman proceeded to train hundreds of uniformed patrol officers to conduct RJCs
and to implement the experiments on schedule at midnight on July 1, 1995.
The four Canberra experiments were collectively named the “RISE project”,
Sherman’s acronym for Reintegrative Shaming Experiments, in reference to
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Braithwaite’s (1989) theory. The offense types were selected primarily on the basis of
their high volume and low-to-medium seriousness, after discussions with many officers
about their willingness to refer arrestees for various crime types to be randomly
assigned to avoid prosecution. The four offense types were non-domestic (and non-
sexual) violent crime committed by offenders aged under 30, property crimes against
personal victims and shoplifting in large stores committed by offenders aged under 18,
and driving with legally excessive levels of alcohol in the bloodstream—the latter
always detected by police through proactive roadblocks and random breath testing with
a breathalyser—with adult offenders. The use of RJC for these offenses was unprec-
edented in Canberra, as well as in most of Australia.
Five years later (and several years behind schedule), the ANU posted the first report
on RISE outcomes on the Australian Institute of Criminology website. These prelim-
inary findings included a large reduction in recidivism by violent crime offenders
assigned to RJCs, relative to those prosecuted as usual. UK government officials soon
read this report (Sherman et al. 2000*) during negotiations with the UK Treasury over a
Home Office request for extra funding to develop restorative justice. Treasury had long
encouraged greater use of randomized trials, so it agreed to provide £5 million for
restorative justice on the condition that it be used for RCTs.
A Home Office Request for Proposals attracted several proposed quasi-experiments,
but no RCTs, from UK institutions. The only proposal for RCTs came from Sherman and
Strang through the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania
(Penn) with ANU as a subcontractor. The bid offered to build on the RISE experience in
testing RJCs on UK cases, using RCT designs.While several quasi-experiments were also
funded, the Jerry Lee bid won the majority of the funding available.
The Penn proposal was filed on behalf of The Justice Research Consortium, a
network of three police agencies (Metropolitan Police, Thames Valley Police, and
Northumbria Police), in partnership with Her Majesty’s Prison Service, the new
National Probation Service, and the ANU’s new Centre for Restorative Justice. The
proposal called for a large number of RCTs on the RISE model of diversion from
prosecution. That plan was quickly discarded when the Home Office said RJ could only
be used as a supplement to existing conventional justice (CJ), and not as a substitute (as
in RISE). The grant also required that formal consent be obtained from both offenders
and victims before an RJC could be considered. These two requirements meant that all
random assignment for adults required cooperation from either courts, prisons or both;
they could not be conducted solely on the basis of police discretion as in Australia.
The Penn-led team therefore developed the UK RJC program in close collaboration
with courts, yielding both success and failure. The success was with the (higher-level)
Crown Courts, which became very cooperative and supportive of the experiments. The
relative failure was with the higher-volume (lower level) Magistrates’ courts, where
most of the experiments had been originally planned. Both were asked to refer cases for
RJCs after guilty pleas had been accepted, but sentencing had not yet been pronounced.
Crown Court Judges, with support from Lord Chief Justice Harry Woolf and frequent
contact with London managers Sarah Bennett and Nova Inkpen, were generally willing
to adjourn sentencing for 21 days in order to allow for an RJC to take place.
Magistrates’ court clerks were not so cooperative. While two small RCTs in Northum-
brian Magistrates’ Courts were eventually completed, their samples were only achieved
by dogged persistence of the Northumbria Manager, Dorothy Newbury-Birch.
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Our 2001 Crown Court negotiations in London proved critical to recruiting
adequate sample sizes, as confirmed by the fate of a statutory authorization of pre-
sentence RJCs a decade later. When the Home Office provided funding for such
conferences in 2014–15, a group of Crown Court judges decided that victims
would have to consent to RJCs even before a guilty plea was offered. Since RJC
staff were usually not able to cite a guilty plea, or even locate the victim in time,
this requirement made it almost impossible to deliver RJCs to victims of serious
crimes. Hence, RJC was seen to “fail” because the Judges set it up to fail, perhaps
unknowingly, but without any reference to the previously successful practice of
seeking offender and victim consent only after a guilty plea has been offered and
the case adjourned for a potential RJC (Strang 2015).
What emerged from all the experimental struggles in the UK from 2001 to 2004
were eight separate RCTs that supplemented rather than replaced the CJ in each
category at that time. For all control groups across all 12 experiments, the treatment
conditions were the standard CJ at the time for that type of offender and offense.
Table 1 summarizes both the four RISE RCTs and the eight UK RCTs with their control
groups.
Sample pipelines: “suction,” not trickle-flow
Each of these 12 experiments drew cases from what is technically called a sequential
“trickle-flow” rather than by “single-batch” random assignment (Sherman and Strang
2010). Yet the use of the word “flow” is problematic, at least to a hydraulic engineer.
The idea that cases in randomized trials emerge from a “pipeline” of referrals (Boruch
1997) implies that there is hydraulic pressure at the back end of the pipe, pushing the
contents (criminal cases rather than liquids) out of the front end like a water tap. Our
experience was that very little hydraulic pressure could be generated from the back end
of our pipeline. What worked for us was suction from the front end, pulling whatever
contents were accessible at the back end into fast forward, sometimes against the active
resistance of forces blocking the pipeline.
In Canberra, the only way we received cases was from officers making arrests, 24 h
per day. The protocol was for the officers to call our research officer on duty on a
dedicated mobile phone number to determine whether the case was eligible. The
researcher asked a standard set of questions, and recorded the case details if it was
eligible. Then, the researcher opened the next numbered envelope in the random
assignment sequence for the appropriate experiment and informed the officer of what
the treatment should be (prosecution or RJC).
The system worked fine when officers called us to enrol cases, but they called far
less often than they could have done. Despite our training some 500 officers, our
project quickly went out of sight and out of mind. The RISE project was most visible in
the first 2 years whenever police mounted roadblocks for random breath testing, each of
which was guaranteed to catch a few offenders. When those offenders were booked, the
arresting officers usually called the RISE number for random assignment of the
disposition. Since the same officers made other kinds of arrests, they could easily
remember the RISE project for violence and property cases as well. After the target of
900 drink-driving cases had been met, however, that experiment stopped taking new
cases, so the roadblocks disappeared as a reminder for other cases.
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We made repeated attempts to motivate the officers to call us, but we were blocked
by the upper ranks of the AFP. Our attempts to use the same techniques we had used in
previous police experiments were repeatedly rebuffed by the hostile upper ranks. We
only asked for time to communicate with the referring officers about the progress of the
experiments, just as we had in Minneapolis and Milwaukee (Sherman et al. 1992) in
monthly meetings, usually accompanied by beer and pretzels. But in Canberra, even a
suggestion that we bring a coffee cake to a police station for an informal discussion was
rejected as a “corrupt” attempt to “bribe” the police officers to alter their judgment
about whether a case was appropriate in their view for the equipoise between the two
conditions needed to justify the referral. Thus, for 5 years after the initial training, the
AFP never allowed us to speak to groups of officers on police premises again about the
value or learning from the project.
What ultimately succeeded as the “suction” of cases from the pipeline was multiple
conversations one-on-one, both day and night, between ANU research staff and AFP
officers. These conversations were telegraphed by relay messages through the social
networks of Canberra police, years before Facebook or other electronic social media
had even been contemplated. By Strang and her team cultivating, one-on-one, a small
band of supporters within the police force, the research team kept the cases coming in
until all four experiments had at least 100 cases.
In London, the challenge of creating suction was even more daunting. After
unsuccessful efforts to gain case referrals from both defense attorneys and court clerks,
Inkpen and Bennett developed a relationship with probation officers who tracked
requests for pre-sentencing reports. Had the experiment been done a few years earlier,
there would have been a far higher volume of such requests, especially from Magis-
trates’ courts. But by 2002, cost-cutting had greatly restricted the number of pre-
sentence reports that could be done, limited to the most serious offenses, which were
usually sentenced in Crown Courts. Thus, the London experiments gained the names of
offenders for whom the clerks had requested pre-sentence reports, usually within 24 h
of the request.
Bennett and Inkpen developed such close connections with London Probation that
they were approved for training and official access to the case management systems,
totally relieving the probation staff from any work on the project. Each day the Jerry
Lee Program’s London team checked the details of each new guilty plea for eligibility,
forwarding the eligible cases to the police officers in the RJ Units.
The RJ Units immediately assigned a police constable to contact the offender,
usually by going to the prison where they were being held on remand, in order to seek
the offender’s consent to meet with the victim. Once the offender agreed, the same
constable approached the victim to propose a 50 % chance of meeting with the
offender. If the victim agreed, then the constable used a special local number to
telephone a University of Pennsylvania research officer in Philadelphia who would
re-screen the case for eligibility and issue the random assignment when appropriate. By
2002, Barnes had converted the process of random assignment (for all 8 UK experi-
ments) to a secure computer program, with an algorithm generating an instant deter-
mination of whether the victim would be offered an RJC. The constable (or other
facilitator requesting the victim’s consent) immediately informed the victim of the
assignment, and when this was for RJC, proceeded to schedule a convenient time for
the victim to come to the prison (or other location) for the meeting.
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Similar processes to enrol cases were used in the other two UK sites. In Northum-
bria, Newbury-Birch and eight police constables worked in a fashion similar to the two
London teams of similar size (one each for south or north of the Thames). The
Northumbria team extracted names with eligible cases from both Youth Offending
Teams (YOTs) and Probation Offices by daily faxes of names. Fax machines were set
up by the Jerry Lee Program in the probation offices so that their staff could routinely
fax the daily lists for pre-sentence reports to the researchers. When on some days the fax
did not arrive, Newbury-Birch would call the offices before noon to press for speedy
delivery.
In Thames Valley, the process was much slower, especially with prisons, the number
of which expanded from 1 to 12 prisons as the experiment progressed with a grindingly
slow rate of case flow. The question for the prisons was the names of people incarcer-
ated for eligible offense types who ideally were approaching a scheduled time to be
released. The probation team then attempted to obtain consent from the prisoners, and if
successful, then contacted their victims for consent and random assignment (see
Table 2).
Exactly what proportion of potentially eligible cases we were able to capture is
difficult to determine. While Table 2 shows the cases that we reviewed in England, we
could only review a sample of potential cases in RISE. Strang (2002*: 69) reports that,
out of a 6-month universe of eligible arrestees for the property experiment, 12 % were
referred into RISE. For the violence experiment, the rate was 11 %. What biases caused
the police to refer some cases to RISE and not others remains unknown, thus reducing
the external validity of the findings even within Canberra. But since the project could
only proceed on the basis that officers could refer cases to either prosecution or RJC
without random assignment—if they felt personally certain that the referral was exactly
what was best for that case and could not ‘risk’ the case being assigned to the
alternative treatment—there was little scope for capturing a larger share of the pipeline.
In principle, the sample was described as cases in which the arresting officers were
equally inclined to think that either prosecution or RJC would be appropriate disposi-
tions for each arrest referred to random assignment—something for which a truly
eligible pipeline could not be identified in retrospect from records alone.
In all these efforts, our team continuously promoted the “coalition of the willing”
(Strang 2012a*, b*, c*) to extract by “suction” the number of cases needed for adequate
statistical power in each test.What we did not do was to test or even document our success
in getting conferences to happen—the number of visits to victims and offenders, phone
calls to their supporters, taxi fares paid or police cars sent to get participants to RJCs on
time, even child care of crying children outside the meeting room. That oversight was
arguably an important failure on our part, since we failed to describe the full conditions
necessary to operate a successful RJC production line. Efforts to operate RJ programs in
the years since our experiments have beenmore hampered by their challenges in obtaining
cases than by any other challenge, perhaps because they were not set up on the principle of
“doing what it takes” to make an RJC happen.
Consent, random assignment and treatment delivered
A major challenge to RJCs is the skeptic’s presumption that victims and offenders will
refuse to meet with each other, even when invited to do so by police or probation
L.W. Sherman et al.
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officers. While consent to RJC is hardly universal, our evidence shows it was far higher
than sceptics presume. Yet, it also seems that more formal processes of seeking consent
(as in the English experiments) yield lower take-up rates than less formal processes (as
in RISE). Had there been a requirement for formal consent by both parties in each case,
the Australian experiments may never have been completed.
Yet, for all the ease of getting the cases to random assignment in RISE, the police
capacity to get the RJC to occur was much better in England. This section describes the
success of RISE in consent against less success in treatment-as-randomly-assigned,
with less success at consent in England but far higher rates of treatment as assigned.
Take-up rates by victims and offenders
RISE The RISE project handled consent informally. Arrestees in eligible cases with
victims were simply asked by police, while they were being booked, whether they
would be happy to have a meeting with the victim rather than being prosecuted in court.
Almost 100 % said yes, enabling the arresting officer to call the RISE staff any hour of
the day or day of the week for random assignment of treatment. This offer to offenders
was made even more attractive in RISE because it meant the offender could avoid a
criminal record. Victim consent was obtained in RISE only after the case was randomly
assigned to a designated RJ officer who would organize the RJC; it was that RJ officer
who would call the victim to ask them when (not whether) they would like to meet with
their offenders. On that basis, Strang estimates that some 90 % of the personal victims
invited to attend a conference agreed to do so. The larger problem in Canberra was that
such a high proportion of cases assigned to conference never received a conference. In
the violence and property experiments combined, 23 % of the personal victims assigned
to an RJC never actually attended one because it never took place (Strang 2002: 81).
London In London, the Jerry Lee Program tested RJCs with some of the most serious
cases of the 12 experiments, in which both offenders and victims had some reluctance
to meet. Some of the victims had been seriously injured by their offenders in stranger
robberies; one taxi driver was hospitalized for over a week. The robber was initially
reluctant to accept a 50 % chance to meet with his victim, although he agreed to do
so—as four-fifths of the offenders did when asked by police (Table 2). When randomly
assigned to attend a conference, the robber spent most of the RJC weeping apologet-
ically and saying he had not meant to hurt the victim so badly. Similarly, almost half the
burglary victims had seen the offender in their homes. Nonetheless, over half of all
burglary victims agreed to random assignment for a meeting if their offender had
consented first (Table 2).
Other UK sites The UK experiments described in Table 2 suggest a pattern of lower
consent rates for adult post-sentencing cases than for other adult crimes—but this may
be due to institutional differences and to the seriousness of the crimes, rather than stage
of the criminal process. Three of the four joint offender-and-victim consent rates for
pre-sentence adult cases in London and Northumbria were about 40 %, with only the
Northumbria property crime experiment as low as 30 %. But the two post-sentence
violence cases in Thames Valley, with perhaps more serious victim injuries, had an
average of 21 % joint consent, about half as high as the other adult RCTs. (The two
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youth experiments in Northumbria are not comparable, since they were merely com-
paring two different ways of diverting young people from prosecution on first and
second offenses only; parental consent was an additional requirement not found in adult
cases.) To our knowledge, this is the only systematic evidence that take-up rates are
higher for pre-sentence than for post-sentence offers of RJCs.
Treatment delivered as assigned
All 12 RCTs faced challenges in implementing the treatment as assigned (TAA). If the
treatment is defined as a policy of trying to treat people with either conventional or
restorative justice, the rates of successful delivery of each policy were high. That is,
people were prosecuted when random assignment said to prosecute, even though they
may never have appeared in court for a wide variety of reasons, many of them
administrative; but the policy for what to do with them was never altered. If the
treatment is defined as implementing the theory of either conventional or restorative
justice, then the TAA rates are much lower (Sherman and Strang 2004b*). For theorists
of restorative justice, these experiments are unsatisfactory, since they include so many
cases assigned to RJC that never received them. In no case, however, did that
percentage drop below a ratio of at least 10 to 1 compared to the control group. Thus,
even in theory, the experiments all compared groups that had very large differences in
the rates at which they experienced RJC.
Using the theory-testing definition as the most conservative approach to measuring
TAA, Table 3 presents the rates at which each of the experiments recorded various
dispositions of the cases.
Table 3 shows that the TAA rates were substantially higher in the UK experiments
(mean=94 %) than in the Australian RCTs (mean=86 %). For the delivery of RJCs as
assigned, the difference was similar: a mean of 81.3 % in RISE and 88.3 % in the UK.
This contrast is largely explained by differences in organizational infrastructure be-
tween the policing arrangements for RJ in the two countries. In the RISE tests, both
infrastructure and leadership suffered recurrent changes. At various times, a special
“diversionary conferencing” unit was created, changed and re-created to manage the
process of delivering the RJCs, both within and outside of the random assignment
sample. No one leader was held accountable for the cases, let alone the results.
Facilitators for the RISE conferences at some points were full-time specialists; at other
points, they were general patrol officers who had attended the training but had no prior
experience in facilitating an RJC. The average number of previous RJCs for the
facilitators in the three juvenile experiments was under five for the first 3 years of
RISE, but went up substantially in the last 2 years when the cases were concentrated in
a specialist unit.
The UK experiments, in contrast to those in RISE, were led by the same strong
operational staff with a single organizational structure from start to finish. The six UK
police experiments all operated with a full-time specialist model, vertically integrating
the tasks in each case from offender consent to facilitating the conference and following
up with victims on promises made. The prison and probation experiments used a more
flexible staffing model, but almost all of them stayed with the project for 4 years and
acquired substantial experience. This level of stability helped to avoid the kinds of
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problems that emerged in Canberra, where several cases were assigned to constables
who never even tried to arrange an RJC. When offenders failed to appear for RJCs in
the UK, the police would locate them and re-schedule the conference—another differ-
ence from Canberra, where RJCs were often dropped after an offender failure to appear,
and the case referred to prosecution.
Even our role as criminologists was different in the two countries. In RISE, we were
the arm’s length evaluators, with no role in generating cases or implementing random
assignment. In the UK, we were tasked by the funders and the police with insuring the
best implementation of the project so that others could evaluate it. That meant our full-
time site managers were the primary people responsible for obtaining consent and
delivering RJCs, in equal partnership with the dedicated agency staff who performed
the front-line work. Whether this was all structural, however, depends on whether we
had learned enough from watching the AFP in RISE to do a better job at case
management in the UK. What we learned should probably be spelled out in an
operational manual, as we discuss below in “Discussion: more work to be done”.
From a theory-testing standpoint, the most problematic of the 12 experiments is the
juvenile property crime RCT in Canberra, where the percentage of cases in which RJCs
actually occurred after random assignment was only 65 %. Nonetheless, the percent of
cases assigned to prosecution in which RJCs were delivered was only 1 %. Thus, the
intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis of these cases as randomly assigned maintains strong
causal inference of about different outcomes from very different rates of RJC delivery,
or 65 times more RJC delivery in the ITT group for RJC than for prosecution.
Table 3 Delivery of RJC and CJ as randomly assigned in 10 police-led experimentsa
Experiment No. cases
assigned
to RJC
No. cases
treated
with RJC
No. cases
assigned
to CJ
No. cases
treated
with CJ
Percent of RJC
cases treated
with RJC
Percent of CJ
cases treated
with CJ
Full sample
treatment
as assigned
RISE violence 50 41 50 45 82.0b 90.0 86.0
RISE property 86 56 87 77 65.1b 88.5 76.9
RISE shoplift 59 52 54 48 88.1b 88.9 88.5
RISE drink-drive 450 405 450 432 90.0 96.0 93.0
London burglary 118 96 109 109 81.4 100.0 90.3
London robbery 61 51 67 67 83.6 100.0 92.2
Northumbria
adult assault
24 21 21 21 87.5 100.0 93.3
Northumbria
adult property
34 31 36 36 91.2 100.0 95.7
Northumbria
youth assault
51 46 50 50 90.2 100.0 95.1
Northumbria
youth
property
54 52 56 56 96.3 100.0 98.2
a Data not presently accessible for the two probation-led experiments in Thames Valley
b Data differ from Sherman and Strang 2004b fig. 2, based on persons in cases randomized; this table uses
case-based random assignment for RISE (identical for drink-drive experiment only) and person-based analysis
for the UK experiments
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The estimates for the benefits of RJCs resulting from these 12 experiments may
substantially under-estimate what could be obtained in theory. Yet, they are arguably
more useful as estimates of the effectiveness of a policy in practice, as opposed to its
underlying “efficacy” under conditions of perfect compliance.
Measuring treatments and outcomes: short and long
The Jerry Lee Program of Randomized Trials in RJCs has a rich, if not entirely
consistent, set of measures of both treatment delivery and outcomes. The Program
remains a work in progress. Outcomes have been reported for all 12 RCTs for up to
2 years, although 6 of the UK trials have only reported outcomes for the partial sample
gathered by an independent evaluator within its own reporting deadline. Treatment
delivery has been fully analyzed in 8 of the program’s 12 RCTs, but further analysis of
the full sample has yet to be completed in 4 of the UK tests. In the 4 RISE RCTs, the
detailed systematic observation of both RJCs and control cases has provided a rich
theoretical analysis of RJCs for three kinds of theory: reintegrative shaming, procedural
justice and interaction ritual chains. RISE also has the benefit of 10-year interviews
with hundreds of offenders and victims, as well as up to 18 years of mortality data and
criminal history records, post-random assignment, for both victims and offenders, for
which analysis is in progress.
The eight UK experiments, in contrast, collected much less qualitative mea-
surement of treatment delivery than RISE. Nor have the UK tests had any follow-
up data collection since 2007. Yet, they offer a far wider range of samples than the
RISE tests, across different offense types and different points of the criminal
justice system.
These differences in measurement between the Canberra RISE and UK parts of the
Jerry Lee Program were created by external constraints of the funders. The Jerry Lee
Program was created by a merger of the existing RISE project with the new UK project,
created when the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania
won the Home Office grant to conduct the eight UK experiments. The Home Office
grant required the Jerry Lee team to play a different role in England from the role we
had played in Australia. In Canberra, we had served as both “developer” and “evalu-
ator” of the RJC program (Eisner 2009; Sherman and Strang 2009a*). In England, by
government policy, the two roles had to be separated. While the University of Penn-
sylvania and the Justice Research Consortium had won the grant to develop the
program, the University of Sheffield was selected as the independent evaluator of its
effects. That meant that while Penn would recruit all cases and document their random
assignment, all post-treatment impact analysis funded by the Home Office was assigned
to Sheffield (see all reports by Shapland et al.*).
Thanks to funding from the Jerry Lee Foundation, George Pine and other philan-
thropists, the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania was
also able to fund its own data collection on UK outcomes. This had several advantages,
but it led to a somewhat confusing situation with several features:
& In the UK RCTs, substantially more cases were randomly assigned than the
University of Sheffield had funding to gather data on within its grant budget and
time frame, leaving a larger sample size unanalyzed for the official government
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reports, even though the full sample has been used in some other analyses (e.g.,
Bennett 2008*).
& The eight UK RCTs were merged into seven in the Shapland et al. (2008*) reports
because the independent evaluator chose to combine the two juvenile RCTs in
Northumbria, which pooled property crime–other and violent offenses.
& Systematic observations of court appearances and conferences, as well as victim
and offender interviews, were attempted for all cases in RISE, but only for partial
samples of cases (by Shapland’s team) in the eight UK experiments.
& The London victim interviews conducted by Angel (2005*; Sherman et al. 2005*;
Angel et al. 2014*) were focused primarily on measuring post-traumatic stress
symptoms and other specific items, and were not linked to other measures of victim
outcomes collected for the Sheffield sample.
& RISE attempted to obtain detailed interview measures of offender perceptions of
procedural justice and other attitudes within 6 months, 2 and 10 years of the random
assignment; the UK experiments did not.
& UK RCTs as analyzed by Shapland et al. (2008*) and summarized by Sherman and
Strang (2012*) provide precise cost-effectiveness estimates of the investment in the
RJCs; RISE did not.
These RISE versus UK differences are especially pronounced in terms of offender
recidivism outcome measures. All 12 of the Jerry Lee Program’s RCTs have reported
findings on offender recidivism (Shapland et al. 2008*; Sherman et al. 2000*; Sherman
and Strang 2012*; Strang et al. 2013*), but in only one analysis were identical
measures used for all 12 (Sherman and Strang 2012*)—and even that one relied on
Shapland’s combination of results from the two Northumbria juvenile RCTs. The eight
UK tests are largely limited to 2-year after-only reconviction rates from the Shapland
et al. (2008*) independent evaluation of the UK RCTs, with the truncated sample of all
randomized UK cases (but see Bennett 2008*). The after-only approach is arguably not
as strong as the before–after, difference-in-difference approach, which has been report-
ed for at least 2 years before and after random assignment for RISE (Sherman et al.
2000*; Woods 2009*). This approach better adjusts for the baseline differences in
offending rates between experimental and control groups. Because many of the sample
sizes are relatively small, the difference-in-difference approach helps to improve the
precision of the estimated effects.
RISE recidivism outcomes are also reported for much longer time periods than for
the UK experiments. This reflects both differences in funding and in the complexity of
compiling the criminal history data from the partner police agencies, which has been far
easier with the single RISE partner (the Australian Federal Police) than with the three
separate UK police partners. The long-term data in Australia have been especially
important in clarifying the effect of RJCs on juvenile Aboriginal offenders, as reported
below. Arguably the greatest gap and most pressing agenda for the UK experiments is
to obtain follow-up measures of recidivism for as long as RISE has.
Finally, the RISE recidivism data have been able to distinguish different kinds of
offenses in ways that have been more challenging for the UK experiments. While
Shapland et al. (2008*) computed the estimated cost of the various offense types
included in offender recidivism, their evaluation did not clearly distinguish between
new offenses against victims from either breaches of previous sentencing orders
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(technical violations) or non-victim offenses, such as possession of illegal drugs,
commercial burglary, or drink-driving, as Woods (2009: 47*) did for RISE.
Describing treatment delivery
The qualitative dimensions of treatment delivery in the four RISE experiments were
measured with a systematic observation instrument available online at the University of
Michigan ICPSR (see http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/2993?
geography=Global). The global ratings of the theoretical dimensions of the RJCs and
the control group court appearances were tested for inter-rater reliability early in the
first year of RISE, with high reliability scores (Harris and Burton 1997*, 1998*). The
data taken from these instruments have been used in analyses by Rossner (Rossner
2008a*, b*, 2011a*, b*, 2013*) as reported below. In addition, Harris (2000*, 2001*)
and Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2001*) have analyzed these data, while Inkpen
(1999*) has reported an ethnographic study of a sample of the same conferences.
Facilitator differences in procedural justice
Individual differences across the many officers in Canberra who facilitated RJCs were
identified from analysis of the systematic observation data (Sherman et al. 2003*). Woods
(2009*) then used the initial post-RJC interview data with offenders, aggregated for each
facilitator, to test three hypotheses to explain facilitator differences in the three RISE
experiments involving juveniles (i.e., this analysis omitted the drinking-driving experi-
ment). Woods’ analysis was designed to discover whether there was any difference in
interview-measured perceptions of procedural justice by offenders who sat through the
conferences according upon the a) total experience, b) recent practice, or c) innate ability
from the first RJC of each police officer facilitating the conference. In effect, he compared
two “practice makes perfect” hypotheses to one “natural ability” hypothesis (Gladwell
2008). He found no evidence of any improvement in procedural justice perceptions as
individual facilitators gained more practice or had recent experience. He did, however, find
a large and consistent difference between some facilitators and others in offender percep-
tions of the officers’ fairness. This leads us to the following:
Conclusion #1: Selection of facilitators based on innate ability is more important
than experience or practice in generating procedural justice from restorative justice
conferences.
That conclusion notwithstanding, the research so far does not tell us how to predict
whether one potential facilitator has more ability to generate procedural justice than
another. It just tells us that this difference can be measured in practice based on offender
interviews. Even that finding may have more general applicability to the selection of
police and others exercising authority in the justice systems.
Process issues in completing conferences
Woods (2009*) also examined the differences between RJ conferences in RISE that
were completed and those that ultimately failed to occur, for both administrative
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reasons (such as an officer deciding not to carry through or forgetting about the task
assigned) and offender-related reasons (such as the offender moving out of the juris-
diction or being arrested on a new charge). Woods found that while attempts to hold
RJCs shortly after the arrest had a high risk of failure, so did those that were delayed
beyond several months. This leads to the following:
Conclusion #2: RJ Conferences with both victims and offenders present were
most likely to be completed in Canberra if they were scheduled to take place
roughly between 6 and 12 weeks after random assignment.
The Canberra evidence, however, must be read in light of the diversion of the RJ
case from prosecution, which meant that the timing of an RJC lacked any court or other
deadline. The UK evidence for pre-sentence RJCs, in contrast, was strongly tied to
court deadlines. With 21 days adjournment from guilty plea to sentencing in Crown
Court, for example, there was a strong sense of urgency by all parties in completing an
RJC process before the sentencing hearing. Similar deadlines were present with the
prison, Magistrates’ Court and juvenile experiments in the UK, although not with the
post-sentencing probation experiment under community sentencing or the prison
experiment. The UK experiments, as Table 3 shows, had higher treatment as assigned
rates than in RISE. While there were many other organizational differences between the
RISE and UK experiments, there is still reason to believe this evidence supports the
following assessment:
Conclusion #3: The urgency of a sentencing or other court deadline may lead to
higher rates of completed conferences from using RJC as a supplement to court
rather than using it as a substitute.
Causal mechanisms: inside a ‘black box’
Randomized experiments are often criticized for not testing causal mechanisms that
may explain any effects of different treatments. While this criticism fails to acknowl-
edge the long history of science providing unexplained benefits based solely on
effects—such as the prevention of scurvy with citrus fruit or the prevention of cholera
with clean water (Sherman 2015)—there are undoubted advantages to understanding
plausible causal mechanisms for clear effects. Funding differences allowed more
investment in this task in RISE than in the UK, about which very little evidence is
available concerning the ‘black box’ of causation across all cases (but see all
Shapland* reports for selected samples of cases). Whether the causal effects found in
RISE would be valid for the UK experiments is unknown, but it is at least possible that
they are more generally present in RJCs.
Offender perceptions of procedural justice
There is strong evidence from RISE that RJCs increase offender perceptions of proce-
dural justice, at least when used as a diversion from court. Barnes (1999*) first found
this, in a theoretically coherent analysis of both process and outcome variables, in
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the RISE drink-driving experiment (see also Barnes et al. 2015*). Tyler et al. (2007*),
using a more multivariate strategy with similar data, found the same result. Strang et al.
(2011*), in the RISE Final Progress Report, also reported item-by-item differences that
showed higher levels of perceived procedural fairness in all four of the RISE experi-
ments among the RJC-assigned offenders compared to those assigned to court.
Conclusion #4: Offenders in all four RISE experiments showed higher levels of
perceived procedural justice if they were randomly assigned to (but not necessarily
completed) RJ conferences than if they were assigned to court.
Shaming: reintegrative and stigmatic
The RISE experiments accomplished their primary theoretical purpose of testing
Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming, which RISE generally confirmed
but elaborated. The fundamental hypothesis was that RJCs would produce higher levels
of reintegrative shaming (hate the sin but love the sinner) and lower levels of stigmatic
shaming (hate the sinner and the sin) than prosecution in court. As predicted, the RISE
experiments all produced much higher levels of reintegrative shaming in perceptions of
offenders assigned to RJCs than among those assigned to prosecution. Not as predicted,
however, the RJCs also caused offenders to feel more “disapproved of” than similar
offenders said they had felt in court (Harris 2001*: 130). These findings led to
substantial revisions of reintegrative shaming theory with more complex conceptuali-
zation of shame and guilt, drawing on the nuanced measures in both the RISE
observations and offender interviews (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001*).
This evidence lends support to the reformulation of the idea that reintegrative
shaming is the opposite of disintegrative (or stigmatic) shaming (Braithwaite and
Braithwaite 2001*). Braithwaite’s (1989) initial theory had presented the two on a
continuum from stigmatic to reintegrative. But the RISE evidence suggested that the
offender’s experience could be classified on two independent dimensions simulta-
neously, such as being high on both stigmatic and reintegrative shaming, so that
shaming of both kinds can co-exist in ways that enhance an offender’s sense of guilt.
On this basis, RJCs producing a higher level of feeling disapproval may still act as a
crime prevention mechanism. Thus Harris’s (2001*) RISE analysis, although limited to
the drink-driving experiment in which RJCs failed to prevent crime, lends support to a
revised view of the theoretical mechanism of RJCs can create more fulsomely than a
brief court appearance, along with higher levels of procedural justice, even though
RJCs failed to reduce crime in that experiment:
Conclusion #5: RJCs for Canberra drink-driving offenders produced a higher level
of shame and guilt than court appearances, even though they reported a higher
perceived level of procedural justice, with no reduction in recidivism.
Further insight into the causal mechanisms of the RISE offenders’ experience in RJC
versus prosecution, by experiment, were gained from our 10-year follow-up survey
(Table 4). The response rates were of borderline utility, especially in the shoplifting
experiment, which was also the only one to have a higher response rate from the
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prosecution-assigned group than from the RJC group—and the only one where less
than half of the respondents could even remember the experience. We present these
results for whatever readers may think they are worth. Even with possible sampling
bias, it is interesting that they show such strong effect sizes on so many items. The
effect sizes on offenders being pleased that their cases were handled by RJC (compared
to prosecution) were very large, as were the effect sizes on making them less angry and
bitter about the justice they received. Shame over the crime or themselves was not very
different between treatment groups, thus undermining (but not falsifying) any kind of
shaming theory of recidivism prevention. Only the violent offenders said the RJC
experience was a turning point in their lives, which fits the fact that the strongest
reductions in frequency of repeat offending in all 12 experiments were in the RISE
violence experiment, where the emotions at play tended to be much more powerful than
in the other three RISE tests.
Whatever the causal mechanism may be, the survey shows striking persistence of
differences between the RJC-assigned and prosecution-assigned groups. Whatever
happened in the RJCs, it appears to have been highly memorable and affecting, at
least compared with any other hour or two in most people’s lives.
Conclusion #6: The offenders’ experience of RJC-assignment in RISE, at least
among respondents to a 10-year survey, produced lasting differences in attitudes
and emotions from those of prosecution-assigned offenders who responded to the
survey, almost all showing better self-reported re-offending than the prosecution
group respondents.
Interaction ritual theory
One theory of an RJC’s causal mechanism was published after RISE began—and
indeed was partly shaped by RISE itself: Randall Collins’ (2004) reformulation of
Erving Goffman’s interaction ritual perspective. Citing RISE (among much other
evidence), Collins proposed that the key elements of a successful interaction ritual
are a) co-presence of all participants in the same place, excluding non-participants; b) a
shared focus on a particular topic; and c) a conversational and bodily rhythm; all of
which recommits all those present to the shared morality of a group. He stated this in
terms of linear dimensions, a continuum by which ritual encounters can vary in the
degree to which they produce the key elements of the theory. The more successful they
are in doing so, Collins suggests, the greater the level of group solidarity, emotional
energy, and recommitment to the shared morality.
The work of former Jerry Lee Program London staffer Rossner (2008a, b*, 2011a,
b*, 2013*) has tested Collins’ theory with qualitative analysis of a sample of RJCs in
the London experiments and quasi-experimental analysis of the observational data of
the RJCs in the RISE youth violence and youth property experiments. While she could
not compare the RJC cases to the court cases, she was able to analyse the differences
across conferences in three key elements of Collins theory: reintegration, solidarity and
emotional energy. Moreover, Rossner (2013*: 131–135) could relate the success of
each RJC in achieving a strong interaction ritual to both the prevalence and frequency
of rearrest. She shows that higher levels of solidarity and reintegration in an RJC
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predict lower levels of reoffending, but that higher levels of emotional energy do not.
Her findings were somewhat complicated by other factors, such as the presence or
absence of a prior record. Nonetheless, her evidence provides correlational, if not
causal, support for this assessment:
Conclusion #7: Juveniles randomly assigned to RJCs in the RISE property and
violence experiments had less repeat offending when observations of their confer-
ences showed higher rather than lower levels of solidarity and reintegration.
Main effect findings so far
Offender recidivism
While RJCs in general proved more effective than CJ in preventing recidivism, the
Jerry Lee Program has found important complexities in both short-term and long-term
results. In two of the four RISE experiments, for example, the after-only rate of
convictions was higher for the offenders randomly assigned to receive RJCs than it
was for the cases assigned to prosecution. Both the drink-driving and the juvenile
Table 4 Ten-year survey of RISE offenders, by experiment
Experiment: Drink-drive Violence Property Shoplifting
RJC response % 61 % 64 % 62 % 52 %
Prosecution response % 62 % 48 % 58 % 67 %
% Both groups who remembered RISE case Bwell^ 74 % 65 % 56 % 45 %
Questions Cohen’s D Cohen’s D Cohen’s D Cohen’s D
+ for RJC + for RJC + for RJC + for RJC
Were they pleased with the way their case was handled? +1.65 +1.28 +.72 +1.33
Should the government make RJCs more widely available? +.67 +.30 +.35 +.13
Were they ashamed of the crime they had committed? +.12 +.26 +.21 +.03
Were they ashamed of themselves for
committing the crime?
+.08 +.30 +.22 +.18
Did the punishment they received make up for the
harm the crime had caused?
+.54 +.71 +.13 +.7
Were they now angry about the punishment they received? −.50 −.48 −.04 −.24
Were they now bitter about the punishment they received? −.43 −.26 −.01 −.05
Did they currently want to get back at those
who caused their punishment?
−.29 −.28 −.33 +.36
Was their experience an important event in their lives? +.15 +.28 +.21 +.03
Was their experience one that affected their lives? +.12 −.23 +.17 +.21
Was their experience a turning point in their lives? +.16 +.50 +.07 +.07
Did the experience help you to obey the law? +.32 +.25 +.25 +.34
Did the experience help your friends and
family to obey the law?
+.55 +.02 +.17 +.55
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property crime experiments appeared to backfire by this measure, causing more crime
rather than less in the first 2 years of follow-up. Other complexities of RJC effects on
recidivism are related to a) whether there is a personal victim who can be included in
the RJC, b) the use of cost (or “harm”) of crime rather than counts of crime as if all
crimes are created equal, and c) the length of follow-up period in which effectiveness is
defined.
Personal victim offenses There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that because
an RJC without a personal victim cannot be restorative to a victim, it cannot really be
an RJC. Whether this is true as a normative theory—and there are plausible claims that
it is possible to ‘construct’ victims, including members of the offender’s family, for the
purpose of an RJC—an empirical model of causation that draws on empathy for
another human being as a victim cannot be achieved in RJCs without a victim
(Sherman and Strang 2011*). Offenders, in theory, cannot experience as much intensity
of remorse without someone they had actually harmed expressing the pain they had
suffered. It is for that reason that the RISE and UK experiments with personal victims
present in the RJCs (RISE without the shoplifting and drink-driving experiments) were
the only Jerry Lee Program experiments incorporated into our Campbell Collaboration
Systematic Review of RJC effects (Sherman 2014*; Strang et al. 2013*). That review
found overall reductions in recidivism of RJCs compared to conventional justice, for
RJCs with personal victims present. (The exclusion from that review of two RCTs on
offenses without personal victims was also made on policy grounds, since victim
benefits are an equally if not more important aim of RJCs, and they are impossible to
achieve with RJCs for non-victim crimes.)
Conclusion #8: The average effect of RJCs on offenders is to reduce the frequency
of repeat offending, as observed in 9 out of 10 experiments with personal victims.
One of two experiments without a personal victim (drink-driving) showed an
increase in frequency of repeat offending.
Cost of repeat offending Most experimental criminology counts repeat offending as if
all crime is created equal. It is not (Sherman 2007, 2013). The use of a crime harm
index (CHI) that weights each crime with a ratio-level indicator of seriousness is a far
superior approach to examining the effects of any justice policy. The independent
evaluator of our UK experiments (Shapland et al. 2008*: 64) used just such an
approach in testing the cost-effectiveness of RJCs in our UK RCTs. Their method used
the Home Office data on the costs of crime (to both victims and government) to
compare the financial value of crimes prevented by adding RJCs to Conventional
Justice vs. the costs of providing RJCs in our UK experiments.
This calculation was extremely important, but not readily transparent to many
readers. We therefore re-computed the cost–benefit ratios from data in the Sheffield
report, spelling out the overall cost–benefit ratio for the UK experiments at 8:1, or £8 in
costs of crime prevented for every £1 spent on providing RJCs to supplement the
prosecution and sentencing (Sherman and Strang 2012*; Strang et al. 2013*). This ratio
ranged from a high of 14:1 in the London robbery and burglary cases combined, to a
low of 1.2:1 in all Northumbrian cases combined, with a majority of them juvenile
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offenses. The benefits were highest where the frequency and seriousness of prior
offending was highest, in the London experiments, where the burglary offenders had
a 5-year pre-conviction mean of 5.89 prior burglary convictions and the robbery
offenders had a mean of 3.48 prior robbery convictions (Bennett 2008).
Conclusion #9: RJCs were cost-effective in all seven UK tests preventing more
cost of crime in the short run of 2 years follow-up than the cost of delivering the
RJCs, with far more cost-effectiveness among serious offenders with many prior
convictions.
Similar cost-effectiveness estimates are not available for the RISE cases.
Short- or long-term recidivism effects The Jerry Lee Program has highlighted a
central issue in evidence-based policy: how long is long enough, or too long, to
measure outcome differences between treatments? While various authorities have
recommended a 2-year minimum follow-up of any program randomly assigned to
individuals, there is currently no discussion of a maximum period for follow-up.
While our analyses show clear overall effects of RJCs on reducing recidivism at
2 years (Strang et al. 2013), the RISE analyses show that these benefits have
disappeared by 15 years (Sherman et al. 2015a, b*). These data suggest the
following assessment:
Conclusion #10. While RJCs reduce recidivism for 2 years, analyses of the RISE
evidence to date shows no main effect on recidivism after 15 or more years.
Victim benefits
Short-term victim benefits The impact of RJCs on victims has been highly beneficial
in both RISE and the UK experiments. Some of these findings have been quasi-
experimental, before–after differences with the group of victims who attended confer-
ences (Strang and Sherman 2003*; Strang et al. 2006*). The most important differ-
ences, however, have been based on experimental estimates (Angel 2005*; Angel et al.
2014*; Strang 2002*; Sherman et al. 2005*).
It was Strang (2002*: 97) who first showed that RJCs reduced the percentage of
victims of violence and property crime who feared that the offender would revictimize
them, from 18 to 5 %. More importantly, she showed that RJCs reduced victims’ desire
for violent revenge (Strang 2002*: 138–139) against the offenders, from 20 to 7 % (and
from 45 to 9 % for victims of violent crimes only) (see also Sherman et al. 2005*).
Finally, she found that victims were more likely to be pleased with the way their case
was dealt with if their offenders had been assigned to RJCs (69 %) than if they had been
prosecuted (48 %).
Conclusion #11: Victims assigned to RJCs in RISE were less fearful of repeat
attack by the same offenders, more pleased with the way their case was handled,
and less desirous of violent revenge against their offenders than controls.
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UK tests Short-term victim benefits of RJCs were somewhat weaker in the UK
evidence than they were in the RISE experiments. Shapland et al. (2007*: 42) found
slightly weaker effects in the UK experiments, when RJCs only supplemented the CJ
process, rather than substituting: 72 % of RJC-assigned victims were satisfied or very
satisfied compared to 60 % of victims whose cases did not receive RJCs. But the UK
control group (CJ) victims (unlike the RISE CJ victims) had all expressed a willingness
to meet with their offenders prior to random assignment, and had often reported
disappointment to the constable who obtained their consent about their not being
selected for RJCs.
The Campbell Systematic Review (Strang et al. 2013*) also incorporated the
findings of eight sets of victim interviews by Strang and Angel, as first reported in
Sherman et al. (2005*): victims were far more likely to receive apologies in RJCs than
in conventional justice; the RJC-assigned victims were more likely to receive apologies
they found to be sincere; they were no less likely to blame themselves for the crime
than conventional justice-assigned victims; in the London experiments, the RJC-
assigned victims were more likely to forgive their offenders than were the CJ-
assigned; and across all eight results, victims were less likely to want violent revenge
if they had been assigned to meet with their offenders than if not.
Conclusion #12: Victims assigned to RJCs in both the UK and RISE were more
likely than control group victims to receive offender apologies, be more satisfied
with their justice, and less desirous of violent revenge than controls.
The most powerful evidence of victim benefit from RJCs is the Angel et al. (2014*)
evidence that RJCs reduce the post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) reported by
victims. Using a standard psychiatric diagnostic tool in telephone interviews of 192
London victims of robbery and burglary, the Angel team found 49 % fewer victims
suffering clinical levels of PTSS among the RJC-assigned victims than among the
victims assigned to CJ only. These findings were limited to short-term impact, but they
reflect basic life functions such as sleep and ability to leave the home to go to work.
They also imply a possible long-term reduction in an otherwise elevated risk of
premature mortality, which has been associated with chronic PTSS, even at low levels
(Kubzansky et al. 2007).
Conclusion #13: London robbery and burglary victims assigned to RJCs suffered
much less post-traumatic stress than controls.
Long-term victim benefits
The evidence so far shows that victim benefits of RJCs last longer than any effects on
offender recidivism. While our only long-term victim effects data so far come from a
10-year post-random assignment survey for the RISE violence and property experi-
ments, Strang’s (2011*) research team on this survey achieved a substantial panel
response rate of 81 % (n=188 out of 232 initially interviewed), which was 72 % of 260
initially sought for interviews. After 10 years, the benefits for RJC-assigned victims
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remained clear: they still had half as much anxiety about being revictimized as victims
whose cases had been prosecuted (22 % RJ vs. 44 % court, p= .00); half as much anger
about the crime (58 % RJ vs. 26 % court disagreed that they were still angry, p= .01);
and half as much feeling of bitterness about offense (75 % RJC vs. 38 % court
disagreed that they still felt bitter, p= .00).
Other benefits for RJC-assigned victims, if borderline in statistical significance, were
less general fear of crime (22 % RJC vs. 34 % prosecution, p= .11), and more
disagreement that they would do some harm to offender now (80 % RJC vs. 63 %
prosecution strongly disagree, p= .10).
Two measures that showed no difference between RJCs and court were (1)
whether the treatment of their case had put their minds at rest (around 75 % of
both RJC-assigned and prosecution-assigned said it had not) and (2) whether the
victims felt forgiveness of the offender (20 % of both treatment groups remained
unforgiving). But another, more subtle measure showed an important benefit for
the RJC victims, who were more likely to have forgotten just what happened in
the justice process they attended (47 %) than court-assigned victims who attended
court (33 %).
Conclusion #14: Substantial victim benefits in reducing the emotional impact of
the crime resulted from random assignment to RJCs in the two Canberra RISE
tests and persisted for at least 10 years after the arrest of their offenders.
Moderator effect findings so far
One strength of the Jerry Lee Program has been its capacity to detect important
moderator effects: not just whether RJCs “work,” but for whom they work more or
less well, or even make things worse. Such differences have been found to date for
victim gender, offense severity, offender baseline offending frequency, offender drug
use, and initially for race in Australia (Strang and Sherman 2015*), although the latter
appears to have disappeared in a 15-year follow-up (Sherman et al. 2015a, b*) and will
be reported in detail in a separate article.
Post-traumatic stress reduction and gender
If restorative justice were to be rationed on the basis of the greatest benefits it produces
for victims, there is good evidence for prioritizing women. The Angel et al. (2014*)
analysis of the post-traumatic stress symptoms reduction in London showed that while
RJCs reduced PTSS as a main effect, women victims had much higher PTSS levels
after burglary and robbery victimizations than male victims did. They also showed
much more PTSS reduction after RJCs than men: 46 % were above subclinical levels of
PTSS in the female RJC-assigned group compared to 78 % for female controls, while
men only had a difference of 37 % RJC-assigned versus 45 % for controls.
Conclusion #15: Female victims of robbery and burglary in London had much
greater short-term reductions in PTSS levels than male victims, although both
genders showed benefits of RJC on PTSS.
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Repeat offending and offense severity
The Strang et al. (2013*) systematic review of RJC effects on recidivism included a
moderator analysis by offense severity. The biggest effect of any moderator in that
analysis (including offender age, time at risk, use of conviction outcomes only or
including arrests) was the interaction of RJCs with offense severity. The concept of
severity was crudely indicated by the instant case being for either a violent crime or a
property crime. While one of the RCTs included in the Systematic Review was not part
of the Jerry Lee Program, that RCT (McGarrell and Hipple 2007; Jeong et al. 2012)
used the same trainers as all the Jerry Lee Program experiments. The overall standard-
ized mean difference in 2-year frequency repeat offending was D=−.163 (P= .001), yet
the same measure for only the three property crime-only experiments was D= .001
(P= .989). The meta-analysis of the five violent crime RCTs, however, yielded a
standardized mean difference in favor of the RJCs of D=−.198 (P= .045). Thus, it
seems fair to say that in general:
Conclusion #16: The average effect of RJCs (compared to CJ) on repeat offending
across all three reported property crime experiments was nil, while the average
effect of RJCs across five experiments with violent crime was a modest but
statistically significant reduction in the frequency of repeat offending.
Repeat offending and offender baseline frequency
Another issue in using RJCs is whether it is best used only for first offenders (as often
claimed), and inappropriate with high-frequency offenders since for them it is “too
late”: they have become “hardened criminals.” The evidence from the Jerry Lee
Program in two hemispheres shows exactly the opposite.
Both the Canberra (Woods 2009*) and London experiments (Bennett 2008*)
provide consistent evidence on how RJC effects vary by baseline offending frequency.
Analyses in both cities use arrest frequency over a 5-year period prior to random
assignment as the baseline rate of offending. The repeat offending measure in Canberra
was arrest frequency in a 5-year follow-up; in London, it was time-to-failure from
random assignment (or prison release) to date of first offense resulting in arrest in the
time period 2002 through 2005. In both cities, the evidence shows that RJC effective-
ness appears to be curvilinear: they work best for offenders with the highest and lowest
frequency of prior offending. RJCs work least well for offenders with a moderate
frequency of prior arrests.
Sarah Bennett’s (2008*) analysis of offender time-to-failure in the two London
experiments found no statistically significant differences between the RJC-assigned
offenders and those equally willing to meet with consenting victims randomly assigned
to the control group. “Failure time” in Bennett’s analyses was the number of days
between release from prison (or random assignment date for those not in custody) and
the date of the first offense that led to an arrest (Bennett 2008*: 79). This “crime-free”
period was actually longer for RJC cases (compared to controls) in both experiments
(Bennett 2008*: 82), especially in the robbery experiment (522 days for RJC vs.
371 days for controls), but the differences had very wide confidence intervals (range
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of error). Yet, since only 61 % of the sample offenders had any rearrest during the
follow-up period ending December 31, 2005, there was substantial variation to explain.
When Bennett specified more homogeneous subgroups of the experimental samples,
more than a “chance” number of subgroups showed statistically significant differences
between the RJC and control groups in time-to-failure. This phenomenon may be an
example of Weisburd et al.’s (1993) paradox, in which smaller sample sizes are more
likely than larger samples to produce statistically significant differences because
smaller samples may be less heterogeneous, with smaller standard deviations. The
most important instance of this was the level of baseline frequency of arrest.
First, Cox regression results indicated that the frequency of arrests in the 5 years
prior to random assignment had a statistically significant interaction effect with RJC
and time to failure (Bennett 2008*: 159), in both the burglary experiment (n=227) and
the robbery and burglary experiments combined (P< .0001). She defined high frequen-
cy offenders as those with a mean of over seven arrests per year at risk in the 5-year pre-
random assignment baseline period. These high-frequency offenders had a mean of
94 days to first offense in the control condition, but 234 days (a 149 % increase) in the
experimental condition (Bennett 2008*:160).
Second, Bennett (2008*: 160) found that London robbery offenders (n=128)
showed the same pattern. Offenders with a baseline rate of over seven arrests per year
for 5 years before pleading guilty to a robbery charge had over twice the mean survival
time after random assignment to an RJC (316 days) than after assignment to CJ
(140 days).
In the same experiments, however, Bennett (2008*:160) also found evidence that
RJCs worked better to delay repeat offending if they had the lowest baseline rates of
arrest than if they had medium rates. She defined the lowest rates of baseline arrests as
less than two arrests per year, and medium rates as between two and seven arrests per
year, in the 5 years prior to date of random assignment. Robbery offenders with the
lowest baseline rates had a mean survival time of 382 days in the control and 634 days
in the RJC-assigned condition, or a statistically significant 66 % increase in time to first
repeat offense (see Fig. 1). A significant increase in failure time for lowest baseline-rate
burglary offenders was in the same direction, but much smaller: 507 days over 474 days
(7 % more).
Bennett’s (2008: 160) London analysis also found evidence against using RJCs for
medium rate offenders (2–7 arrests per year in baseline). Medium baseline-rate of-
fenders in burglary had only a 13 % increase in failure time after assignment to RJCs.
Even worse, medium-rate robbers had a statistically non-significant, but backfiring
effect from RJCs—which cut their mean time to failure from 350 days for controls to
219 days for RJCs (a 37 % reduction, or a 60 % benefit from not using restorative
justice).
Daniel Woods’ (2009*) analysis of the three RISE experiments that included
juvenile offenders (n=512) discovered a strikingly consistent replication of the patterns
Bennett (2008*) found with burglary and robbery offenders in London. While the mean
frequency of arrests in the RISE 5-year baselines (about two arrests per year for crimes
with personal victims in the highest-frequency trajectory, and less than one per year in
the lowest) was far lower than in the London tests, RISE also showed a curvilinear
pattern of RJCs working better on high-rate and low-rate offenders than medium-rate
offenders. Using an even longer follow-up period in Canberra than Bennett could use in
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London (a 5-year follow-up after the 5-year baseline for all Canberra cases, for a total
of 10 years of measurement), Woods used annual frequency of arrests of a specific kind
(rather than time-to-failure for any new offense, as in London) as the outcome measure.
Woods (2009*) grouped all offenders in the three RISE experiments with juveniles
into six trajectories of frequency of arrests for crimes with personal victims only (using
trajectory analysis as described by Nagin 2005). His premise was that the RJC
emphasis on empathy with victim suffering would be best tested by its impact on
crimes against victims, as opposed to drug possession, drink-driving and other offenses
without personal victims.
Woods then adjusted for the moderating effects of restorative justice with Aboriginal
versus non-Aboriginal offenders, which led to his omitting all of the Aboriginal
offenders from his final trajectory analysis, including two outlier cases that later
analysis suggested to be driving overall findings about Aboriginals (Sherman et al.
2015a*, b*). Woods’ decision in 2009 had the effect of reversing an initial (1 year after
random assignment) increase in arrest frequency among highest-frequency offenders
receiving RJCs (as Fig. 2 shows in the solid line rather than the dotted line controls in
the same trajectory group). This procedure showed the biggest benefits of RJCs in
reducing recidivism frequency among the most frequent offenders in the baseline
period.
Conclusion #17: In three RISE tests and the robbery and burglary experiments in
London, RJCs had the biggest effects on reducing recidivism on those offenders
who had the highest rates of offending in the baseline period, and modest effects
on very low-rate or first offenders, but was ineffective or criminogenic for those
offenders with medium rates of offending in the baseline period.
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Repeat offending and offender multiple drug use
The link between drugs and crime is perhaps most hotly debated when discussing
justice for drug-using offenders. The complexity of that debate runs into moderator
effects on justice with offenders using different kinds of drugs one-at-a-time, or the
difference between people using only one kind of drug vs. two or more kinds of illicit
drugs simultaneously. Bennett (2008*: 202–204) used this discussion to examine any
moderator effects of drug use patterns of the effects of RJCs on time-to-failure. She
found the London experiments offered a good opportunity. While 89 % of the London
robbery and burglary offenders were reported to be using drugs at the time of arrest,
only 53 % of burglars and 37 % of robbers were using both crack cocaine and heroin
(combined n=152). For those who did not use both crack and heroin, assignment to an
RJC raised the mean days to first offense by 26 %, from 355 days to 447. But for
offenders who did use both heroin and crack, assignment to an RJC backfired, by
reducing their time to failure 29 %. The mean number of days at risk to first offense was
340 in the control group, but only 242 in the RJC group. The evidence thus supports
this assessment:
Conclusion #18: London offenders who used both crack and heroin reoffended
more quickly if they had been assigned to RJCs than to controls, but offenders who
did not use that combination of drugs reoffended more slowly if they were
assigned to RJCs than to controls.
Race and restorative justice
Early evidence in RISE suggested that RJCs had been criminogenic for Aboriginal
offenders (Strang and Sherman 2015*). Subsequent analyses have called this conclu-
sion into question (Sherman et al. 2015a*, b*) and will be the subject of a detailed
analysis in a future report.
Fig. 2 Source: Woods 2009*: non-aboriginal subsample—impact of RJ vs. CJ on arrests for crimes with
personal victims in three RISE Experiments (violence, property crime and shoplifting)
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Discussion: more work to be done
It seems unlikely that the 18 conclusions distilled in this review would have been
produced in an ad hoc, one-RCT-at-a-time collection of experiments. The conclu-
sions repeatedly draw on comparisons of answers to similar research questions
across different kinds of offenses, offenders, and stages of the criminal process, as
well as different countries. The external validity of the collective findings when
analyzed in this fashion would seem to be far greater than what might be possible
with 12 different experiments done by different research teams and organizations.
That said, the addition of the independent evaluators in the UK experiments,
combined with a standard approach to experimental design by the Jerry Lee
Program, adds extra credibility to the external validity of the patterns (see Eisner
2009; Sherman and Strang 2009b). Given the frequent lack of any replication of
policy experiments, with too many variations in practices being tested (and control
groups compared to them) even when experiments are repeated, the Jerry Lee
Program has clearly been different.
With this compilation of findings as an example, we are now able to make a stronger
case in favor of governments and foundations obtaining greater benefits from a
program of RCTs, rather than providing the same amount of funding for an ad hoc
collection of experiments. Yet we must also ask whether we have made the most of the
opportunity provided to us by a 12-RCT program. We can answer that question by
reflecting on what else might be done with evidence from the Program, and specifically
what we can aim to accomplish in the near-term.
There seems to be sound argument for three priorities: (1) we should publish more
theoretically-focused articles or books that would feed the academic appetite for
advancing theories, and not just facts, about crime and justice; (2) we should produce
more highly specific manuals for practitioners, or “field guides” for how to create
“suction” of criminal cases into RJCs in different settings; and (3) we should push even
harder to test RJCs in more controversial areas, such as serious crimes, where our
evidence shows that the benefits in harm reduction would be far greater for crime
victims than where it is currently used.
But how does it work in theory?
One obvious way to get knowledge into practice is to make the knowledge more central
academically, not just professionally. This is obvious because academics are the
primary knowledge brokers on crime policy. While the professional or political demand
for knowledge about justice innovations may not be great, the opportunities to supply
knowledge may be heavily concentrated in the hands of university-based criminolo-
gists. These scholars not only advise the media and their local justice agencies on their
opinions of what works. Academics also shape the views of tens of thousands of
students who may go on to make and deliver justice policies.
Despite the 75 publications listed in the Appendix, the Jerry Lee Program has
arguably made little dent in academic thinking about justice innovations. Had at least
some of the publications taken a more explicitly theoretical approach, there may have
been more attention paid to restorative justice in undergraduate courses on the criminal
justice processes. There might even have been more academically-initiated experiments
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and research on RJCs in a wider range of jurisdictions, offense types, and stages of the
criminal justice process.
How do we know there has been little academic impact of the findings to date? One
indicator is as simple as Google Scholar citation counts. Of the top ten publications
listed when the words “Restorative Justice” are entered into Google Scholar, only three
contain data from the Jerry Lee Program. Of those three, the highest citation count
(1642 since a 2002 publication, or 130 Citations per year) is for the most theoretically
elaborated interpretation of the experimental evidence (Braithwaite 2002). Other highly
cited work is also more theoretical than the majority of the publications we have
produced, which emphasize the empirical results over their theoretical meaning.
Why is it so important to use theory to gain academic attention and credibility? The
answer is not limited to academics. The desire for understanding why something is true
(Tilly 2006) is quite general, and may affect people’s willingness to believe that
something really is true. Closely related to the desire to know why is a preference for
stories over statistics, as the key funder of our Program, the radio broadcasting
entrepreneur Jerry Lee of Philadelphia, has so often said. Stories about people provide
a narrative that allows readers of any background to empathize with anyone—including
offenders or victims who have been offered or denied RJCs. A decade ago, we
suggested the power of experimental ethnography, as a marriage of quantitative and
qualitative methods, to address this appetite (Sherman and Strang 2004a). Yet, we have
so far not produced a rigorously theoretical, let alone a qualitative–quantitative,
analysis of our programmatic evidence in a mainstream peer-reviewed criminology
or social science journal.
A field guide to getting criminal cases
At the opposite end of the continuum of theory to practice, we have failed to provide
enough how-to-do-it instruction for practitioners. The need for such guidance is evident
in every new initiative that is funded to provide restorative justice. Every such initiative
of which we have heard has crashed against a wall of too few cases being offered for a
program to be viable. Even the initiatives funded by the Home Office in 2001 that were
not RCTs faced far greater difficulties than we did in generating cases that were dealt
with by restorative justice.
We arguably have a lot of ‘good practice’ to share, at least in terms of implemen-
tation. Including our UK (non-controlled) Phase I practice cases, the Jerry Lee Program
in 2001–2005 recruited over 1000 cases in which both offenders and victims agreed to
meet (some 400 of which were randomly assigned to control groups). As far as we
know, no other organization has ever produced 1000 cases in which full agreement was
reached to conduct RJCs. How we did it is something that can be spelled out, but it is
usually too detailed for academic or scientific publications.
A case in point was recently suggested by the experience of the post-2013 legislative
authorization of Judges adjourning cases for RJCs prior to sentencing in Crown Court.
That is exactly what we had tested in London in 2001–2005, obtaining some 500 cases
of agreements by victims and offenders. Yet when Home Office funding was provided
in 2014–15, the practitioners could hardly extract any cases from the Crown Court in
which to conduct RJCs (Collins 2015). Why was it so much harder to get cases in
normal practice than in our tests?
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The best explanation appears to be the decision of Judges supervising RJCs in 2014
to diverge substantially from our practice in 2001–2005. They required that in order to
conduct an RJC between guilty plea and sentence, the victim had to agree to do so even
before the offender had pled guilty—which many of them do at the last minute. Not
only did the RJ staff have zero time to ask the victims in the latecomer cases, they also
could rarely assure victims that the offender was planning to plead guilty, nor could
they say whether the offender was willing to meet with their victim. This system
differed from what we tested in at least three respects: (1) we had been allowed time by
Judges after each guilty plea to go first to the offenders, and only second to the victims,
to seek consent for an RJC; (2) we had police officers, rather than “civilians,”
approaching both offenders and victims for consent; and (3) we offered the assurance
that the RJC itself would also be conducted by a police officer, which may have
inspired some confidence in both offenders and victims that they would be protected
from physical violence or other disorder by a police presence.
These details may seem petty, but they could also be the small things that make a big
difference, the tipping points between getting cases or not getting cases. In justice
experiments, the importance of conducting programs in exactly the same administrative
system as they have been tested in RCTs is not widely understood. In contrast to
medicine, where every tiny step of a medical procedure or pharmacological treatment is
micro-managed, justice systems tend to be highly variable. There is no tradition in
justice of worrying about little things making a difference, even though they might.
To be fair to the Judges in 2014, however, they could ask the Jerry Lee Program a
very good question: “Why did you not write up the exact methods you used in
successfully suctioning 1000 cases into RJCs?” The answer is less important than the
premise. The fact is that we did not spell out the procedures we used at the level of
detail necessary for anyone to codify “best practice” for implementation. We did touch
on it in a kind of field guide for youth justice practices (Sherman et al. 2008), but we
did not produce field guides specific to different settings, such as Crown Courts. Nor
did we pursue the issue of police versus civilians in their ability to recruit victims and
offenders, which remains a key policy and funding issue in delivering RJCs. Nor, in
fact, did we offer to provide seminars to Crown Court Judges after our research results
were analyzed, despite general invitations from individual judges to do so, another
lacuna we regret.
To each according to their need
Perhaps the most serious critique of the Jerry Lee Program is that we have failed to
convince policymakers that RJCs are better used for serious cases and with chronic
offenders than with minor crimes by juveniles and first offenders. Our unsystematic
observation is that far more RJCs are conducted with minor matters than with serious
crimes and criminals. Our evidence shows that this is poor triage, giving RJCs to
people who have little need of it, and denying it to those whose need is greatest. If there
is one conclusion that we should try to spread to a very wide audience, it is this one.
How we can do that remains a question we cannot answer, except by the basic tools we
use for all our work: grounded theory, trial and error, and systematic evidence.
It is not just the Jerry Lee Program that needs more knowledge about spreading
knowledge effectively. It is all of experimental criminology, and science itself. This
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article not only gives us a chance to reflect on how to put knowledge to work. It should
give our readers the same opportunity, if only by thinking about how our Program
could do better.
We close with one key plan for further research and analysis, driven in large part by
the preceding discussion. The plan is to follow-up on the mortality differences between
victims and offenders in the UK experiments, testing for any effects of RJCs on life
expectancy. Our evidence from 121 offenders under age 30 in one of the RISE tests is
highly suggestive (Angel et al. 2013): while none of the 62 offenders randomly
assigned (1995–2000) to the RJC group in the violence experiment had died by
2013, fully 10 % (6) of the 59 assigned to prosecution were dead (Fisher’s Exact
P= .01). In the UK, we can explore similar questions for victims with psychiatric
evidence on PTSS. If we are able to find medical evidence that lower PTSS levels
predict longer life span, we may well get more attention from governments, judges and
police. We must be mindful of the responsibility we have to pursue this question, with
the fully identified records of over 2000 people in our safekeeping. It may well be that
RJCs, like other criminal justice decisions (Sherman and Harris 2013, 2015), could be a
matter of life and death.
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